Volume 25

Issue 6

Article 14

1980

Securities Law - Rule 10b-5 - Recklessness Formulation of
Scienter Requirement under Rule 10b-5
Thomas G. Wilkinson Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Accounting Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas G. Wilkinson Jr., Securities Law - Rule 10b-5 - Recklessness Formulation of Scienter Requirement
under Rule 10b-5, 25 Vill. L. Rev. 1082 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss6/14

This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Wilkinson: Securities Law - Rule 10b-5 - Recklessness Formulation of Sciente

SECURITIES LAW-RULE

10b-5-RECKLESSNESS

SCIENTER REQUIREMENT UNDER RULE

FORMULATION

OF

10b-5.

McLean v. Alexander (1979)
Plaintiff Malcolm McLean,' having read an opinion audit containing
material misrepresentations 2 in connection with his purchase of all of the
outstanding stock of Technidyne, Inc. (Technidyne),3 sued Cashman &
Schiavi (C & S), the certified public accountants responsible for the audit, as
well as the selling shareholders and an investment advisory firm, 4 alleging
5
violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),
6
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5, and the Delaware
common law of fraud. 7 The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had re1. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1062-63 (D, Del. 1976), rev'd, 599 F.2d 1190
(3d Cir. 1979). McLean was a man of considerable wealth, estimating his personal net worth at
the time of the Technidyne, Inc. purchase in the area of $50 million. 420 F. Supp. at 1062.
McLean first built a trucking empire, McLean Trucking, and later a shipping empire, Sea-Land
Services, for which he is credited with pioneering the concept of containerized shipping. Id.
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, McLean, a sophisticated investor, acquired a series of
highly speculative business enterprises which manufactured technologically sophisticated products ranging from atomic reactor detectors to electron microscopes. Id. at 1063.
2. 599 F.2d at 1194. The opinion audit misrepresented accounts receivable for the 11
month period ending November 30, 1969. Id.
3. Id. at 1193. Technidyne was a small company that developed, manufactured, and marketed as its principal product a laser beam pipe-laying system called "Technitool." Id.
4. Id. at 1194. A New York investment advisory firm employed by Technidyne circulated a
report to prospective private investors stressing the saleability of Technitools and disclosing,
falsely, that the termination of an exclusive distributorship arrangement was due to the distributor's poor performance. Id. at 1193. The report, for which the managing shareholders of
Technidyne supplied the information, further purported to show that 16 Technitools had been
sold in less than three months as a result of the company's direct selling efforts. Id. In fact,
these "sales" turned out to be mere orders, sales conditioned on resale, or consignments. Id. at
1194. Moreover, the exclusive distributorship arrangement had collapsed, not because of the
distributor's unreliability, but because the poor quality of the Technitool units had resulted in
frequent product breakdowns. Id.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) makes it
unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Promulgated in 1942 pursuant to the SEC's rulemaking
authority, rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
id.
7. See 599 F.2d at 1194.

(1082)
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lied upon the audited balance sheet attached to the C & S Report of Examination" which materially misrepresented mere consignments 9 and guaranteed sales 10 as amounts due and owing from bona fide sales transactions.II
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware, sitting without a jury, found for the plaintiff, 1 2 determining that the evidence established, 13 and that liability for scienter purposes under section 10(b) and rule
8. Id. at 1195-96. The C & S report, which contained an audited balance sheet dated
November 30, 1969, limited certification to the balance sheet, declining to attest to the statements of operations and retained earnings. Id. at 1198. An opinion letter attached to the report
also noted the C & S's "examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing
procedures as [C & S) considered necessary in the circumstances." Id.
9. 420 F. Supp. at 1067. The shipment of merchandise to a consignee should not be considered as a sale for accounting purposes because title does not pass to the consignee. ATToRNEY'S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING § 17.02[4] (H. Sellin ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY'S HANDBOOK]. For accounting purposes, consignment sales should be specially noted
on the balance sheet in a memorandum account. Id.
10. 599 F.2d at 1196. A guaranteed sale reserves the right in the retailer to return the
merchandise to the seller if the product cannot be resold. ATTORNEY'S HANDBOOK, supra note
9, § 17.02[9]. Guaranteed sales should not be recognized on the seller's corporate balance sheet
unless "certain conditions are met, including: fixed prices, insurable interest, and ability to
reasonably predict future returns." Id.
11. 599 F.2d at 1196. C & S, in its opinion audit, listed the sum of $73,333 in accounts
receivable as a current asset and designated the amount as "Considered Fully Collectible." Id.
at 1195 & n.3. This figure was primarily attributed to 16 direct "sales" of Technitools to three
customers. Id. at 1198-201. The audit revealed several inconsistencies between purchase orders
and invoices regarding billing dates and deliveries of the corporation's principal product, the
Model V Technitool. Id. at 1199-201. One invoice was dated on the closing date of the audit
and a second, not issued until a week after the purchase order, called for payment nearly nine
weeks after the date on which the purchase order required payment. Id. at 1199, 1200.
In addition, sales confirmation letters sent to each of the four accounts failed to produce
fully responsive statements from the purchasers as to amounts owed Technidyne. Id. at 1199201. Although not inconsistent with Technidyne's documentation of sales, all of the telegrams
received by C & S confirmed the existence of purchase orders but not amounts due and owing.
Id. C & S did not contact any of the accounts in person or by telephone either to obtain fully
responsive replies or to determine why one confirmation letter was never returned. Id.
Further, one confirmation telegram, purporting to account for about $40,000 of the receivables
and accepted as genuine by C & S, was later found to have been fraudulently sent to C & S by
a Technidyne salesman. Id. at 1200. Finally, C & S failed to inquire of management concerning
the retention of Technitool units in its warehouse in apparent contradiction of delivery date
documentation. Id. at 1199, 1200.
For an extensive examination of Technidyne's documentation of transactions and correspondence with each of the four accounts in question, see 420 F. Supp. at 1061-74.
12. 420 F. Supp. at 1086. The district court held C & S liable under both rule 10b-5 and
common law fraud under Delaware law. Id. During the course of a lengthy trial, McLean
settled his claims against the investment advisory firm and the selling shareholders. 599 F.2d at
1194. McLean's case against C & S proceeded to judgment, resulting in a determination that
McLean had suffered $2,514,751 in damages for which C & S was liable as a joint tortfeasor. Id.
at 1194. Applying relative fault principles, however, the court determined that C & S was
responsible for only 10% of McLean's damages and therefore should receive a 90% contribution
from the other defendants. Id. at 1194-95. C & S appealed the final judgment and McLean,
having agreed in a settlement with the investment advisory firm and the selling shareholders to
indemnify all but one of the settling defendants against contribution claims from C & S,crossappealed the contribution allowance and the denial of prejudgment interest. Id. See generally
McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978) (subsequent opinion on the issue of
damages).
13. 420 F. Supp. at 1082-86. The trial judge noted that C & S had provided professional
accounting services to Technidyne since 1967, that it was aware of Technidyne's serious cash
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10b-5 can be predicated upon, a showing of reckless disregard for the
truth. 1 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 15 reversed, holding that the accountant's misrepresentations and omissions in the
opinion audit would support a finding of negligence but did not constitute
the reckless conduct necessary to satisfy the scienter requirement in private
damage actions under the federal securities antifraud provisions. 1 6 McLean
v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
shortage, and that the certified audit was necessary to Technidyne's plan to raise additional
capital through a private placement of securities. Id. at 1082. Further, the court determined
that "obvious conflicts" between purchase orders and invoices, as well as one overdue account,
were signals to the auditors to confer with management. Id. at 1083. As to the adequacy of C &
S's attempt to independently verify sales with Technidyne customers, the district court concluded that C & S "abandon[ed] all caution" when it certified the $73,733 accounts receivable
figure as a fully collectible debt on the basis of one disputed debt, one company's failure to
respond on a $5,000 account, and two nonresponsive telegrams not actually received until after
the report was issued. Id. The district court observed that the accountant's possession of, but
failure to disclose to the investing public information concerning the potential unreliability of
the accounts receivable figure and of Technidyne's sales future placed the plaintiff in a position
where he could not exercise the informed judgment sought to be promoted by the securities
laws. Id. at 1084. According to the trial court, the fact that the accounts receivable figure was
based merely upon the accountant's assumptions, without any request for proper documentation
or verification from management, amounted to "no more than a reckless disregard for the
truth." Id. at 1084-85. The court defined the accountant's recklessness as "pretend[ing] to
knowledge he did not have." Id. at 1084. Finally, the court concluded that the accountant's
designation of the receivables account as "considered fully collectible" on the basis of two assumptions (i.e., that Technidyne used a bill and hold procedure-which would explain the
company's inventory of merchandise supposedly already sold-and that the customers were
credit-worthy), considered together with the fact that C & S failed to request proper documentation or verification of such items from management, constituted a reckless disregard for the
truth. id. The district court noted that generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require
the issuance of a disclaimer when the accountant "has substantial doubts as to material assertions [or] when the scope of his examination is restricted by his client." Id. The district court
further stated that, if compliance with GAAP fails to present fairly the financial posture of the
client company, an accountant may not rely on GAAP to insulate itself from antifraud liability.
Id., citing Sonde, Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws -Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1973). In the present case, for instance, the lower court
asserted that, whatever the designation "considered fully collectible" means to the accounting
profession, "the investing public, however sophisticated, may reasonably infer that the use of
this language presumes some hard knowledge that accounts receivable both exist and will be
paid." 420 F. Supp. at 1084. The court further reasoned that the existence of accounts receivable was of great importance to McLean, in spite of their relatively small size in relation to the
purchase price, because they demonstrated to a prospective buyer of a fledgling company whose
product embodies technological innovation "probably the most important indicia . .. [of]
whether the product being offered has a reasonable chance of sufficient marketability acceptance
so as to ultimately be commercially profitable." Id. at 1075.
14. 420 F. Supp. at 1084. Alternatively, the district court found the scienter requirement
satisfied by the defendant's "knowing misconduct" in failing to disclose material facts in its
opinion audit. Id. at 1082. The court stated, however, that "[t]here is little reason to distinguish
between knowing misbehavior and reckless misbehavior under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In
practice, one who recklessly makes a statement inherently possesses some knowledge of its
falsity." Id. at 1084.
15. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Gibbons and Hunter, and District Judge Meanor
of the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. Judge Gibbons wrote the opinion.
16. 599 F.2d at 1199-202. The Third Circuit also found that knowing nondisclosures of
material facts to a prospective purchaser is sufficient to establish scienter for § 10(b) purposes,
but concluded, contrary to the district court holding, that the evidence taken as a whole precluded a finding that the accountant "knowingly" withheld material information from the purchaser. Id. at 1202, See notes 69-70 & 73-74 and accompanying text infra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 6 [1980], Art. 14

1979-1980]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

1085

The central purpose of the 1934 Act was to promote a high standard of
ethics in the securities industry by substituting a philosophy of full disclosure to investors for the then prevailing philosophy of caveat emptor. 17 Despite this oft-stated commitment, the federal courts, largely due to the Supreme Court's notable silence on issues of professional liability under the
federal securities laws,' 8 have struggled for more than three decades 19 to
define the mental state, or culpability, necessary to impose liability under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 20 The
provisions of rule 10b-5 do not explicitly state the degree of intent required
to impose liability and, in fact, contain language that can reasonably be read
to forbid even wholly innocent misstatements21 as well as language that appears to require at least some level of unlawful intent. 22 Although there has
been general agreement that some form of scienter must be alleged and
proven, 23 the establishment of this requirement has done little to settle the

17. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972), quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). See generally R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 80 (3d ed. 1972).

18. For a partial listing of civil damage actions presenting the question of professional liability under § 10(b) for which a hearing was denied by the Supreme Court, see Parker, Attorney
Liability Under the Securities Laws After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
521, 525 n.30 (1977).
19. A private cause of action under rule 10b-5 was first implied in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The concept was not explicitly approved by the
Supreme Court, however, until 1971. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 12 n.9 (1971), citing 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3869-73 (2d ed. Supp.
1969); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1763-71 (2d ed. 1961).

20. Scienter for rule 10b-5 purposes has been variously defined to mean everything from
knowing falsity with an implication of criminal mens rea, "through the various gradations of
recklessness, down to such non-action as is virtually equivalent to negligence." 3 L. Loss, supra
note 19, at 1432 (2d ed. 1961). It has been suggested that a major contributor to the confusion
surrounding scienter in rule 10b-5 private damage suits is the "extraordinary variety" of transactions covered by the rule. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §

8.4(507), at 204.111 (1979).
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)-(c) (1980). Compare Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc.,
455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1973) (negligence) and Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.
1970) (negligence) with Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1007 (1975) (conscious fault); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (knowledge of
undisclosed facts); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974) (some culpability beyond mere negligence) and Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (willful or reckless disregard for the truth). For the text of SEC rule 10b-5, see note 6
supra.
22. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1980). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 212 (1976); cases cited note 21 supra. Even though rule 10b-5 contains three clauses, see
note 6 supra, commentators have suggested that the same state of mind requirement should
apply to all three since they are aimed at the same types of activities. See 3 A. BROMBERG,
supra note 20, § 8.4(505), at 204.107; Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule
lob-5, 48 N.C.L. REV. 482, 492 (1970); Meisenholder, Scienter and Reliance as Elements in
Buyer's Suit Against Seller Under Rule 10b-5, 4 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 27, 41 (Feb.

1963). But see 6 L. Loss, supra note 19, at 3884-87 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
23. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007
(1975); Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally 3 A. BROMBERG,
supra note 20, § 8.4, at 203; 6 L. Loss, supra note 19, at 3883-85; 3 L. Loss, supra note 19, at
1766; Epstein, supra note 22, at 503-04 (possibly negligence, depending upon effect on flow of
information to public; but scienter clearly met if defendant is convinced of falsity of information
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much-debated issue 24 of what state of mind is necessary for rule 10b-5 liability. 25 In an effort to resolve this problem, the Supreme Court, in Ernst &

27
will
Ernst v. Hochfelder,2 held that a private cause of action for damages
2s
not lie under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 unless scienter is alleged -

or realizes it is probably false, or has no genuine belief in its truth); Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1207 (1970) (scienter just one element of a "sliding scale" of conduct);
Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5
Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 436 (1968) (deliberate, knowing, and reckless
conduct); Comment, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1067-69 (1969) (negligence standard as to trading insiders but not with respect to nontrading issuers).
24. See Mann, supra note 23, at 1206-07. One commentator has summed up the varying
approaches of the courts, observing that "through the use of catch phrases and categories [the
courts] have feigned consistent standards while broadly deciding each case on its individual facts
depending on the result they believe is dictated by their own particular construction of Section
10(b)." Id. Professor Bromberg suggests that the term "scienter" should simply be abandoned. 3
A. BROMBERG, supra note 20, § 8.4(503), at 204.103. Accord, White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724,
728 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974).
25. Scienter in rule 10b-5 cases has been held to encompass a wide spectrum of states of
mind ranging from an intention to deceive, to knowledge of undisclosed facts, to a reckless
failure to acquire knowledge of true facts. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277,
1301 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), quoting Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442,
445 (2d Cir. 1971) ("cases in this circuit clearly indicate that 'facts amounting to scienter, intent
to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device, scheme or artifice to
defraud' are essential to the imposition of liability").
The confusion resulting from the sometimes imprecise and contradictory use of "scienter"
has inspired judicial metaphor. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276,
1290, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) ("the great debate"); Lanza v. Drexel & Co. [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,826, at 90,103 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d
1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) ("the still clouded cauldron in which the oracles continue to
stew"); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969)
("this thicket"). See generally 3 A. BROMBEC, supra note 20, § 8.4(502), at 204.102.
26. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
27. See note 19 supra. The United States Supreme Court recently held, with three justices
dissenting on the issue, that the SEC is also required to establish scienter as an element of a
civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct.
1945 (1980). The Aaron court vacated and remanded a decision of the Second Circuit in which
the appeals court had held that, when the SEC is seeking injunctive relief, proof of negligence
alone will suffice because government initiated actions are brought to provide "maximum protection for the investing public, as contrasted with the purpose of private damage actions which
are brought to obtain monetary relief for individual investors." SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612,
621 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted), vacated and remanded, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980). In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits. Compare SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976) with SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir.
1978). For the statutory, historical, and policy considerations concerning the scienter requirement in injunctive actions, see generally Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51
N.Y.U. L. REV. 769 (1976); Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and Rule 10b-5, 32 Bus.
LAW. 147 (1976); Harkleroad, Requirements for Injunctive Actions Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 2 J. CORPORATION L. 481 (1977); Comment, Scienter and SEC Injunctive Suits, 90
HAsV. L. REV. 1018 (1977); Note, The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of
Section 10(b) After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (1977). For an early
criticism of the Supreme Court's disposition of the injunctive relief issue, see Feller, Aaron
Case: A Technical Analysis Out of Touch with Today's Markets, National L.J., June 30, 1980, at
28-29.
28. 425 U.S. at 193. In Hochfelder, the plaintiffs were induced by the president of a
brokerage firm to make investments in accounts which did not actually exist since the president
had converted the funds to his own use. Id. at 189. The investors charged Ernst & Ernst, the
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scienter being defined as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, ma29
nipulate, or defraud."
Emphasizing the "intentional or willful" character of the statutory language, 3 0 the Court observed that the legislative history of section 10(b), albeit sparse, could not reasonably be read to impose liability "for merely
negligent acts or omissions." 3'
Further, the Court accepted the proposition
that section 10(b) should be interpreted no more broadly than the express
civil liability sections of the 1934 Act which allow a defendant to "escape
liability by showing that the statement was made in good faith. "32
Far from settling the culpability controversy, however, the Hochfelder
Court's enunciation of the scienter standard 3 has engendered continuing
brokerage firm's independent auditor, with aiding and abetting the fraud in violation of § 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 by failing to adequately investigate the brokerage firm's internal accounting
control procedures. Id. at 190. The plaintiffs contended that a proper investigation would have
revealed irregular internal procedures and led to discovery of the underlying fraudulent
scheme. Id. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations encompassed only negligent
conduct which could not support civil liability under § 10(b) and rule lob-5. Id. at 215.
29. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12. While the court observed that a showing of intent to deceive
will clearly sustain a private action under rule 10b-5, it did not explicitly hold that knowing
misrepresentation-generally considered to be a more stringent standard of culpability than
recklessness but a less stringent test than intent-satisfies the scienter requirement in the absence of proof of an intent to deceive. Id. at 214. For a discussion of the relative levels of
culpability, see generally Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule
10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 n.12 (1976). The words "intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud," considered alone, would appear to preclude liability for
both actual knowledge of misstatements and for reckless conduct. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 531 (1938) ("the maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability .. .only to
those persons to whom it is made with the intent to cause them to act in reliance upon it").
Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), is credited with establishing the strict intent requirement for deceit actions at common law. See McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. at 1080 n.118,
citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 699 (4th ed. 1971).
30 425 U.S. at 199. The Court concluded that the use of such operative terms as "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" evinced an "unmistakeable ... congressional intent to
proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence." Id. at 198. For the text of § 10(b),
see note 5 supra. For the text of rule 10b-5, see note 6 supra.
31. 425 U.S. at 210-06. Although having acknowledged in a previous case that Congress
intended that the antifraud legislation be contrued flexibly in light of its remedial purposes, the
Court found no legislative history concerning § 10(b) to contradict its conclusion that the statutory language requires scienter. See id.at 210-11. Further, in light of its conclusion that Congress intended to limit § 10(b) liability to activities involving scienter, the Court determined
that a more liberal construction of rule 10b-5 would involve an overextension of the SEC's
delegated authority under § 10(b). Id. at 213-14.
32. Id. at 206 (emphasis supplied by the Court), quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1934). Accord, Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc);
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972). The Court distinguished the express liability provisions of the 1933 Act which grant civil
relief for negligence on two grounds. See 425 U.S. at 205-11. First, those sections that recognize a cause of action for negligence do so explicitly. Id. at 208. Second, since § 10(b) contains
none of the significant procedural restrictions limiting the availability of relief in suits under the
negligence provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, liability under § 10(b) for negligent conduct
would "nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions" and unnecessarily
broaden liability under rule 10b-5's "judicially created private damage remedy." Id. at 210.
33. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court recognized, however, that, prior to Hochfelder, three courts of appeals, evidencing a rapidly developing trend,
had held in substance that negligence alone was sufficient for civil liability under the federal
securities antifraud provisions. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12, citing White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730
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discussion and disparity, 34 in large measure because the Court carefully declined to decide whether reckless behavior is sufficient to establish civil liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 35 Moreover, as to the potential

(9th Cir. 1974) ("flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (negligence sufficient); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634,
637 (7th Cir. 1963) (dicta) (knowledge not required). The negligence standard was put forward
on the ground that Congress' intent in promulgating antifraud legislation was that the provisions
not be construed "technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes." 425 U.S. at 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). See also Ruder, supra note 23, at 441 (negligence criteria
justified on the ground that it encourages care).
34. Several courts have concluded that, after Hochfelder, requires a showing of "knowing"
conduct. See, e.g., Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d
1325 (5th Cir. 1978). Other courts have taken the position that scienter requires something
more than "mere negligence." Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979); Mansbach
v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977). The commentators have been similarly divided. Compare
Floor, The Scienter Requirement Under Rule 10b-5 and Reliance on Advice of Counsel After
Hochfelder, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 191, 192 (1976) ("constructive knowledge of the crucial facts
based upon reckless disregard of those facts will supply the sufficient element of scienter for
Rule lob-5 private liability") with Liggio, The "Ernst" Ruling-Expansion of a Trend, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 14, 1976, at 2, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Liggio I] (scienter following Hochfelder does not
encompass "the knowing use of a fraudulent device or constructive intent, i.e. reckless behavior, two elements that had previously been included in standards articulated by the circuits"). For current post-Hochfelder discussions of the issue, see also Adams, Lessening the
Liability of Auditors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1037 (1977); Bucklo, supra note 29; Cox, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of Federal Securities
Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977); Goldwasser, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: An AntiLandmark Decision, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 29 (1976); Haimoff, supra note 27; Hampson, Accountants' Liability -The Significance of Hochfelder, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Dec. 1976, at 69; Metzger &
Heintz, Hochfelder's Progeny: Implications for the Auditor, 63 MINN. L. REV. 79 (1978);
Parker, supra note 18; Schnepper, The Accountants' Liability Under Rule 10b-5 and Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The Hole in Hochfelder, 22 ACCOUNTING REV.
653 (1977); Note, Securities Law-Intent to Deceive, Manipulate, or Defraud Must be Alleged in
a Private Action for Damages Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 180 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Intent Note]; Note, Securities Law-Private Cause of Action for Damages Under Rule
10b-5 Requires Scienter-Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 25 EMORY L.J. 465 (1976); Note,
Securities Regulations -Rule lOb-5-Civil Liability Will Not Be Imposed In a Private Cause of
Action Under § 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 Absent an Allegation of "Scienter"; Proof of
Negligent Conduct Will Not Suffice-Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 10 GA. L. REV. 856 (1976);
Note, Securities Regulation-Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder-Rule 10b-5: Reckless or Knowing
Violations?, 2 J. CORPORATION L. 389 (1977); Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule
10b-5 Actions: An Analysis in Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAw. 925 (1977); Note,
Evolving Standards of Personal Liability and Scienter Under Rule 10b-5, 16 WASHBURN L.J.
344 (1977); Liggio, The "Ernst" Ruling-Expansion of a Trend, N.Y.L.J., Apr, 15, 1976, at 1,
col. 2-4 [hereinafter cited as Liggio II]; Liggio I, supra, at 1, col. 2-4.
The American Law Institute's proposed Securities Code includes recklessness in its definition of scienter. ALl FED. SECURITIES CODE § 269AA (Final Draft, 1980).
35. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12. The Court observed that reckless or knowing behavior has
traditionally sufficed to prove scienter in the area of common law fraud: "In certain areas of the
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing
liability for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances,
reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. The Court
also acknowledged that some courts of appeals had found scienter for § 10(b) and rule 10b-5
purposes to be met by proof of reckless conduct. Id., citing Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1973) (en bane).
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liability of accountants in particular, the Court's failure to address the longstanding question of whether compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) should relieve accountants of 10b-5 liability has left many
securities professionals without reliable legal guidelines to follow in everyday
3
transactions.
The general thrust of both commentary and decisions of the courts of
appeals after Hochfelder has been to reject a strict intent to deceive standard
and to recognize that some form of recklessness is actionable under rule
10b-5. 37 One line of cases recalls pre-Hochfelder decisions, which held that
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are to be liberally construed to effectuate the
remedial policies underlying the federal securities laws, 3 8 and concludes that

36. See 425 U.S. at 191. The Supreme Court made only passing reference to the district
court's granting of the auditor's motion for summary judgment on finding no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst had conducted its audits in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards. Id. (district court opinion not reported). Prior to Hochfelder, compliance with GAAP or with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) would not necessarily
insulate an accountant from rule lOb-5 liability. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath 540 F.2d 27, 35-37 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (proof of compliance with generally accepted standards
"may be highly persuasive, but it is not conclusive"). The courts have evidenced some hostility
towards what they consider to be a kind of private lawmaking; their assumption being that a
profession's desire to insulate itself from liability may conflict with the more compelling need to
protect the public interest. See also Metzger & Heintz, supra note 34, at 114 failure to comply
with GAAP and with GAAS may be evidence of scienter).
37. See, e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980); Spectrum Financial Cos. v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1979); Hizer Corp. v. Rose, 601 F.2d 330
(7th Cir. 1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979); Goodman v.
Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790
(7th Cir. 1977). See also Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478,
484-85 (2d Cir. 1979) (recklessness enough for aider and abettor liability only when there also
exists a fiduciary duty to disclose); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-48
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). Cf. Mauldin v. Shaffer, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,211, at 92,456 (M.D. N.C. 1977) (it is "entirely unclear
that reckless conduct can support the imposition of liability under Rule 10b-5"). Significantly,
reckless conduct is sufficient to sustain criminal liability under the securities laws. See United
States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1975); United States
v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Metzger & Heintz, supra, note 34, at 90 ("it
is doubtful that recklessness could suffice for a criminal violation of the 1934 Securities Act and
yet be insufficient as a basis for 10b-5 liability"); Note, Herzfeld Revisited After Hochfelder: The
"Scienter" Standard Applied to the Reporting of Uncertainties, 14 Am. Bus. L.J. 252, 258
(1976). The Supreme Court has recently described Hochfelder as "holding that a cause of action
under Rule 10b-5 does not lie for mere negligence .... " Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 468 (1977). See also Metzger & Heintz, supra, at 86 ("Much of the confusion surrounding the Hochfelder Court's use of the term "scienter" would be eliminated if Hochfelder
were viewed as standing only for the proposition that IOb-5 liability cannot be predicated upon
negligence alone"). But see Liggio II, supra note 34, at 2, col. 3; Intent Note, supra note 34, at
188.
38. For Supreme Court cases espousing a liberal construction, see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (securities acts to be interpreted "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes"); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) ("Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and
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the antifraud provisions should be interpreted no more narrowly than required by Hochfelder.39 A second line of cases analogizes section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 to common law fraud, 40 for which recklessness satisfies the sci41
enter requirement.

restrictively"). See also Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir.
1979).
It has also been observed that a "knowing" or "reckless" scienter standard would be
consistent with the oft-stated purpose of protecting investors against false and deceptive practices:
In keeping with the broad remedial aims of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws such a standard of responsibility, while requiring proof of more than mere
negligence, would not permit [defendants] .. . to escape liability by pleading ignorance
where it can be shown that red flags putting them on notice or providing warning signals
of either undisclosed or misrepresented facts of a material nature were readily apparent to
all and that a routine check would have disclosed the misrepresentation.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 398 (2d Cir.) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
39. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024-25 (6th Cir. 1979). For a
discussion of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Mansbach, see Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations
of "Recklessness" After Hochfelder and Aaron, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 179, 184-86, 196 (1980).
40. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979);
Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977). The Seventh Circuit, drawing on common law fraud concepts, has put forward
one of the fullest explications of the recklessness concept, defining such conduct as
highly unreasonable [conduct], involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents
a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d at 1045, quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla.
Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976). According to the Sundstrand court,
under this test, "the danger of misleading buyers must be actually known or so obvious that any
reasonable man would be legally bound as knowing, and the omission must derive from something more egregious than even 'white heart/empty head' good faith." 553 F.2d at 1045 (footnote omitted). One commentator has observed that the good faith defense noted by the Seventh
Circuit "may be of little consequence, since it is unlikely that, for example, an auditor who
made no attempt to verify accounts receivable before certifying them would be able to successfully convince a court or jury that he merely 'forgot' to do so, and thereby avoid liability" to an
unsuspecting purchaser who had relied on the certified figures to his detriment. Metzger &
Heintz, supra note 34, at 108.
41. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 700-01 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 526 (b) (1938). Examining an auditor's potential liability for common law fraud, the New York
Court of Appeals has stated:
A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accountants when knowledge
there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to
lead to the conclusion that there is no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon
which to base liability. A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if
sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to impose
liability for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet.
State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst 278, N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1938). See also Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 190, 174 N.E. 441, 449 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.). Several commentators have concluded that common law fraud culpability standards should apply in 10b-5
actions. See, e.g., Bucklo, supra note 29, at 228 n.106 (framers of the securities acts drew on
contemporary common law); Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 938, 947 (1969) (if Congress meant to
codify common law as it existed in 1934, it did not forbid federal courts from applying current
common law fraud and participating in the evolution and growth of common law fraud and
deceit principles).
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Operating under the premise that both knowing conduct 42 and recklessness 43 will suffice for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the majority of postHochfelder courts have focused on the scope of these alternative scienter
standards. 4 4 While the post-Hochfelder formulation of scienter in the Third
Circuit was initially uncertain due to that court's choice of language in a case
where there was clearly a specific intent to defraud, 4 5 its more recent pronouncement on the issue, Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Berman,46 clearly established that an accountant's reckless preparation of financial statements 47 may
give rise to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 liability. 48 Although failing to "precisely define the nature" of actionable conduct, 49 the Third Circuit concurred
42. See notes 29 & 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
43. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra. But see SEC v. American Realty Trust,
429 F. Supp. 1148, 1178 & n.8 (E.D. Va. 1977) (recklessness does not satisfy the Hochfelder
scienter requirement).
44. The use of the scienter concept is "particularly prone to word manipulation for the
justification of results reached on other, often unexpressed, grounds." 3 A. BROMBERG, supra
note 20, § 8.4(503), at 204.103. Modifiers and variations, such as "guilty knowledge" and "conscious fraud," are common. Id., quoting E. CADSBY, BuSINESS ORCANIZATIONS, FEDERAL
SECUsRTIEs ACT OF 1934 § 5.03[1[d], at 5-28 (1970).
So, too, courts have consciously failed to specify their standards of liability. See, e.g.,
Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 n.36 (6th Cir. 1979) ("it suffices to
say that the [scienter] standard falls somewhere between intent and negligence. There is little
analytical value in deciding precisely where along this spectrum recklessness falls"); Berdahl v.
SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 647 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978) (court declined "to become embroiled in a semantic
controversy over the varying shades of meaning of such terms as 'intentional,' 'willful,' 'deliberate,' or 'knowing' [because defendant's] conduct was sufficiently purposive" to satisfy Hochfelder's scienter test). See also Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)
(reckless conduct "comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater degree of
ordinary negligence").
45. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976). The Third Circuit
declared that, in order to recover in a rule 10b-5 action, "[tihe plaintiff must prove knowledge
by the defendant, intent to defraud, failure to disclose or misrepresentation, materiality of the
information and, in some instances, reliance by the plaintiff." id.
Before the Supreme Court negated negligence as a standard of culpability, the Third Circuit had held that the scienter requirement was satisfied when the defendant merely had
knowledge of the undisclosed information. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). In Rochez, the Third Circuit cited with approval an
influential Second Circuit opinion which not only embraced actual knowledge of misrepresentations and omissions, but also predicated liability on a reckless disregard for the truth. 491 F.2d
at 407 n.6, citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane).
46. 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978).
47. See 567 F.2d at 574. The district court had denied recovery against the principals of the
company acquired by the plaintiff because their misstatements concerning gross profits had
been made in good faith, induced by the accountant's errors in overestimating total inventory.
Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd in part and rev'd
and remanded in part, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978).
48. 567 F.2d at 574, citing Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977); Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp.,
553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982
(7th Cir. 1976).
49. 567 F.2d at 574. The Coleco court concluded that further elaboration on a recklessness
standard was unnecessary because the plaintiffs had failed to make out a case under any of the
recklessness standards forwarded by other courts. Id. The Third Circuit further asserted that
the scienter for rule 10b-5 purposes is identical to that required for common law fraud. Id. at
574-75.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss6/14

10

Wilkinson: Securities Law - Rule 10b-5 - Recklessness Formulation of Sciente

1092

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

25: p. 1082

in the district court's holding that plaintiffs must prove that their injury
resulted from either a "conscious deception" or a misrepresentation made so
recklessly that it approximated conscious deception."s
In Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,5 ' the Second
Circuit examined accountant liability, focusing specifically on the accounting
treatment of unconsummated sales transactions. 52 The "sales"-purported
real estate transactions in which the audited company had purchased and
resold twenty-three nursing homes for profit 53 -were reflected on the consolidated balance sheet and income statement distributed to investors as "deferred gross profit" 54 and accompanied by an explanatory note stating that
nearly ninety percent of the gross profit "will be considered realized when [a
subsequent] payment is received." 55 The defendant did qualify its opinion
letter 56 and argued, following a trial court finding that it acted with the
necessary scienter in the form of knowledge of the "materially misleading"
nature of the figures, 57 that the qualification should insulate it from liability.5s Nevertheless, the court of appeals found the qualification inadequate
because the accountant failed to "provide a clear explanation of the reasons
for the qualification."' 59 The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, 60 concluding that the accountant's treatment of the as yet unrealized
income from the unconsummated real estate transactions as current and "deferred" gross profit was inimical "to the elemental and universal accounting
principle that revenue should not be recognized until the 'earning process is
complete or virtually complete,' and 'an exchange has taken place.' "61
50. Id. at 574. Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (liability should only attach to
the "kind of recklessness equivalent to willful fraud"). The Coleco court also observed that the
requisite scienter for a rule 10b-5 violation "in dealing with an experienced buyer who is expected to examine the seller's business thoroughly may well be a more culpable state of mind
than that necessary to a violation in public offerings." 567 F.2d at 574-75 n.10.
51. 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
52. Id. at 34-37. For a criticism of the McLean court's analysis of the accounting treatment
of unconsummated sales transactions, see notes 89-97 and accompanying text infra.
53. See 540 F.2d at 30. The sale, in actuality, was arguably nothing more than an option
exercisable at the buyer's discretion. See id. at 29-30.
54. Id. at 30. If ever completed, the disputed purchase and sale would have greatly altered
the audited company's financial posture, producing a conversion of $772,108 in estimated losses
into a $1,257,892 gain by the addition of $2,030,500 "profit" from the nursing home transactions. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The report stated: "In our opinion, subject to the collectibility of the balance receivable on the contract of sale . . . the accompanying consolidated balance sheet and related consolidated statements of income and retained earnings present fairly the financial position of [the
audited company] .... " Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the concept of "fair presentation," see text accompanying note 91 infra.
57. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 124, 126
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. 540 F.2d at 36.
59. Id. (emphasis in origninal). The court further stated that a disclaimer noting that the
transactions forming the bulk of total gross profits were, as yet, unconsummated, would have
sufficed to negate the finding that scienter was present. Id.
60. Id. at 37.
61. Id. at 34, quoting AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AcCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD STATEMENT No. 4, § 150; 2 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CER-
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In McLean, the Third Circuit first rejected the district court's suggestion that the burden of proof shifts to the defendants once their statements
are shown to be inaccurate. 6 2 Although a shift in the burden of proof would
not have changed the outcome of the litigation, Judge Gibbons, writing for
the court, stated that the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion as to each
element of a private cause of action under section 10(b)-including scienter.63
In attempting to "precisely define" the legal standard for recklessness
and to establish the "minimum threshold" for liability for securities fraud, 4
the McLean court approved the Seventh Circuit's "known or objectively obvious danger" test whereby recklessness is established as a matter of law
upon a showing of defendant's "extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care" coupled with a known or objectively obyious danger of misleading buyers or sellers. 6 5 This standard, the court observed, encompasses
accountants' conduct undertaken without "a genuine belief that the information disclosed was accurate and complete in all material respects," 66 such as

TIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (CCH) 9086 (1978). The court simi-

larly found that the defendant's failure to adequately investigate the bona fides of the sales
transactions violated standard auditing procedures which provide, in part, that "[slufficient
competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries and
confirmation to affirm a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under
examination." 540 F.2d at 35, quoting STATEMENTS ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE No. 33, ch.
2, at 16 (1963).
62. 599 F.2d at 1196-97.
63. Id. The McLean court further observed that requiring the plaintiff to carry the burden
of going forward on each element "must have been a central if unarticulated premise of
Hochfelder, since if the burden was not upon the plaintiff to prove scienter, then he need not
have alleged it in his complaint." Id. at 1197 n.10.
64. Id. at 1197. Because the court found that the defendants lacked the requisite scienter, it
stated that consideration of the other issues bearing upon liability-such as materiality, reliance, and the plaintiff's exercise of due diligence commensurate with his sophistication as an
investor-was unnecessary. Id. at 1196 & n.7, 1202 n.20.
65. Id. at 1197, quoting Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). See note 40 supra. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 440, pet. for rehearing en banc granted, 618 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980);
Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F.
Supp. 879, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Lord, C.J.); Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F.
Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
The widely adopted Seventh Circuit definition has been labelled in a recent article the
"highly" reckless standard. Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note 39, at 195. The authors further
observe that the McLean court's refinement of that standard is the added requirement of proof
of bad faith on the defendant's part. Id. & n.83, citing 599 F.2d at 1198. The authors favor
resort to the "highly" reckless culpability standard where the relationship between the parties is
"remote," but would impose a slightly less rigorous burden on the plaintiff where, for example,
"there exists a fiduciary relationship that significantly benefits the defendant or results in the
plaintiff's heavy and foreseeable reliance on the defendant ....
" Id. at 209.
66. 599 F.2d at 1198, citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045
n.20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). The Third Circuit, in an opinion by Chief
Judge Seitz, recently reaffirmed its commitment to the Sundstrand jury charge in Healey v.
Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980). In Healey, the appeals court
held that recklessness for rule 10b-5 scienter purposes following McLean is not satisfied by a
jury finding that defendant acted "with indifference to the consequences." Id.
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was actionable at common law. 6 7 Judge Gibbons further concluded that,
although developed in the context of material omissions, the recklessness
test should be equally applicable to misstatements. 68
Applying this standard, the McLean court determined that the evidence
would support the inference that, when C & S prepared its certified opinion
audit, it harbored a "genuine belief that it had the information on which it
could predicate that opinion." 6 9 According to the court, the record failed to
show that the C & S partner in charge of the audit knew or was even "aware
of the risk," that a number of purported purchase orders were in fact simply
consignments under which the "buyers" were obligated to pay for equipment only if they were able to resell it. 70 The Third Circuit accepted the
testimony of this partner that the accountants believed Technidyne's bill and
hold practice with its distributor explained discrepancies between payment
due dates on purchase orders and invoices as well as between delivery or71
ders and warehouse inventory.
The court of appeals thus rejected the district court's conclusion that C
& S had "actual knowledge" of material facts not disclosed in the audit.72 In
addition, the Third Circuit rejected the district court's finding that the defendant had "knowingly" withheld material information, construing prior
case law 73 as requiring knowledge "not only of the facts withheld, but also of
67. 599 F.2d at 1198, citing O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1937) (lack of
"honest belief"); Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 447-48 (1931) (without a
"genuine belief" in truth of misrepresentation, or with "pretense of knowledge when knowledge
there is none"). For a discussion of common law recklessness standards, see notes 40-41 and
accompanying text supra.
68. 599 F.2d at 1197, citing Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). Moreover, Judge Gibbons asserted that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove bad faith or lack of honest belief. 599 F.2d at 1198. For a discussion of the origin and effect of the good faith defense, see note 32 and accompanying text supra;
note 40 supra.
69. 599 F.2d at 1198. Considering the accounting firm's recital describing the formulation
and limits of its "opinion," the Third Circuit accepted the audit as an expression of opinion
based upon generally accepted auditing standards. Id. For the text of the accountant's recital,
see note 8 supra. In contrast, however, when the trial court was presented with the accountant's position that the certified report was an expression of opinion and not fact, it responded by
remarking that such an argument "hardly warrants a response. The weight of a CPA's opinion
audit is presumed to have a basis in fact and not in speculation." 420 F. Supp. at 1085.
For a discussion of the interrelationship between conformance with generally accepted auditing principles and potential rule 10b-5 liability, see Metzger & Heintz, supra note 34, at
113-18 (failure to apply basic uditing procedures designed to test the adequacy of data provided
by management, or failure to "follow through" on suspicious discoveries, may constitute reckless
or knowing behavior sufficient for rule 10b-5 liability). See also Haimoff, supra note 27, at 162
("Accountants who gullibly accept a transparently fishy explanation from their clients of an obviously suspicious transaction are liable under rule 10b-5, no matter what their mental state.").
For a general discussion regarding the historical development of GAAP and GAAS standards,
see Strother, The Establishment of Generally Accepted Accounting Princples and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, 28 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1975).
70. 599 F.2d at 1199. See notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra.
71. 599 F.2d at 1199, 1200.
72. Id. at 1202, citing Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 584 (3d Cir. 1975); Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976).
73. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993
(1976); note 45 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 6 [1980], Art. 14

1979-1980]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

1095

the risk that the buyer or seller will be thereby misled." 74 Although conceding that C & S "may have been negligent" 75 in failing to pursue confirmation requests concerning accounts receivable 76 and in describing those
accounts as "fully collectible," 77 the court concluded that the accounting
firm's conduct, taken individually or collectively, was not reckless. 78 The
court further stated that, with respect to one customer's account, even if the
defendant had been reckless in failing to question management regarding a
nine-week discrepancy between payment dates recited on a particular
purchase order and the corresponding invoice, and in subsequently failing to
make inquiry when the confirmation request was not returned, liability
would have been denied on the ground that the information in question was
immaterial to McLean's investment decision. 79 Finally, although noting that
Delaware had not yet fixed the standard of liability for an accountant who
renders an insufficiently informed opinion,80 the McLean court refused to
predicate liability upon common law fraud on the ground that scienter was
lacking.81

The district court's opinion in McLean received considerable scholarly
acclaim as the "most careful and extended discussion of the scienter question
since [Hochfelder]." 82

It is submitted, however, that the Third Circuit's

74. 599 F.2d at 1202. The court stated that since the "defendant professed to believe that
his statement of opinion did not present ... a risk" of misleading the buyer, and since circumstantial evidence indicated that the belief was genuinely held, the partner in charge of the
audit could not be considered to have knowingly withheld material information from the purchaser. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1199-201. See note 11 supra.
77. See 599 F.2d at 1201-02. See note 11 supra.
78. 599 F.2d at 1202. Summarizing its view of the accountant's conduct, the court stated:
"The accountant examined purchase orders which appeared to be genuine, received representations from management, took steps to obtain confirmation from the account debtors, and received partial confirmation of 15 of the 16 centrally in issue." Id. The court noted in this regard
that C & S's knowledge that Technidyne needed the certified report quickly in order to obtain
an infusion of capital to remedy its poor financial health, although relevant to the accountant's
mental state, did not lend support to the trial court's conclusion that C & S knew it did not
have the information on which to base its opinion concerning Technidyne's accounts receivable.
Id. at 1201.
79. Id. at 1200. Applying a similar analysis to another account in which $2,000 was in dispute, the court stated that C & S's failure to note the dispute in its report was immaterial for
purposes of McLean's investment decision, since the disputed sum was relatively small when
compared with a nearly $40,000 initial purchase price and since it had no bearing on the
genuineness of purported Technitool sales to the other three customers. See note 11 supra.
80. 599 F.2d at 1202, citing Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Prods. Co., 24 Del.
Ch. 11, 3 A.2d 768, 775 (1939) (suggesting that Delaware would apply common law scienter
principles). For a discussion of the types of conduct sufficient to satisfy common law scienter
requirements, see note 41 supra.
81. 599 F.2d at 1202.
82. See Bucklo, supra note 29, at240 n.205 (citing the McLean district court opinion for the
proposition "that unless otherwise specified, the Securities Acts merely federalized the existing
law of deceit"). Another commentator also praised the trial court opinion, suggesting that
"[McLean] addresses most extensively the issue of recklessness' inclusion within the purview of
the 10b-5 scienter requirement .... This holding is less susceptible to an attack alleging an
insufficient mental state, because it incorporated the principles of common law fraud into the
area of securities regulations." Comment, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925, 937 (1977).
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approach, made with the benefit of three years of case interpretation and
commentary on Hochfelder, while of questionable value in providing guidance to securities professionals, more carefully complies with the restricted
scope of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 liability enunciated by the Supreme
Court. 83

It is clear following McLean that, in the absence of good faith, 84 the
Hochfelder scienter mandate will be met in the Third Circuit by proof of
intentional misstatements, by knowing nondisclosures of material facts
coupled with knowledge on the part of the defendant that the buyer or seller
will thereby be misled, 8 5 or by reckless nondisclosures and misstatements
representing "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care" and
"a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or [objectively obvious]." 8 6 Further, as to the liability of accountants in
particular, scienter for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 purposes may be inferred
from conduct sufficient to establish common law fraud under Delaware
law 7 -that is, when the accountant lacks a "genuine belief" that the information reflected in the audited corporate financial reports is "accurate and
88
complete in all material respects."
While "a showing of shoddy accounting practices" may constitute evidence of scienter, 89 still uncertain after McLean is the effect of the accountant's failure to comply with generally accepted accounting principles. 9"
83. See notes 84-97 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Hochfelder, see notes
26-36 and accompanying text supra.
Predicating liability on reckless behavior should serve at least two of the Supreme Court's
articulated goals in the area of securities fraud. First, requiring plaintiffs to at least show recklessness is a step toward alleviating the Supreme Court's concern that the class of rule 10b-5
plaintiffs "who may seek to impose liability upon accountants" is too expansive. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33, citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 747-48 (1975) ("the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area
of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good"). Cf. Bucklo, supra note 29, at 240
("the inclusion of recklessness within the definition of scienter would not greatly expand the
group of defendants whose conduct fall within the ambit of rule 10b-5 culpability"). Second, the
securities acts' policies of full disclosure and investor protection should be furthered by a scienter standard which does not encourage the coverup of inadvertent mistakes for fear of potential liability. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Note, Securities Regulation-Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder-Rule 10b-5: Reckless or Knowing Violations?, 2 J. CORPORATION L. 389,
403 (1977).
The SEC "continues to believe that a scienter requirement is fundamentally inconsistent
with the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws, lessens investor protection, and constitutes a significant obstacle not only to just compensation of investors injured by violationsintentional or careless-but also to effective Commission action with a view towards prevention
of future violative conduct." SEC Report on the Accounting Profession, No. 876, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 92-93 (Part II, Sept. 10, 1980).
84. See 599 F.2d at 1198. For a discussion of the good faith defense, see note 32 and
accompanying text supra; notes 40 & 65 supra.
85. See 599 F.2d at 1202; notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
86. See 599 F.2d at 1197; notes 64-65 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
87. See 599 F.2d at 1202; note 80 supra.
88. See 599 F.2d at 1198; notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
89. See 599 F.2d at 1198.
90. For a discussion of generally accepted accounting principles, see note 36 and accompanying text supra; notes 13 & 69 supra.
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Likewise, the importance of the duty of "fair presentation," an issue addresssed
at the district court level, is also uncertain because the appeals court
failed to mention the issue. 9 1 It is submitted that the determination of
whether a departure from ordinary standards of care occurred, and whether
that departure was "extreme," should be made with reference to GAAP-as
the courts did in Herzfeld 92 and at trial in McLean 93-except in those cases
where GAAP either do not speak to the specific problem or might produce
materially misleading results. 94 It is suggested that such an approach would
provide helpful guidance to accountants in avoiding potential liability under
the antifraud provisions, as well as ensuring disclosure of material facts in a
manner not likely to mislead.
As to the guidance afforded accountants in everyday auditing decisions,
the McLean case confirms little except that a failure to investigate the circumstances underlying unreturned confirmation requests, together with a
failure to question management regarding discrepancies in account payment
due dates as well as in delivery documentation and warehouse inventories,
constitutes negligence. 95 Consequently, McLean may be seen as standing
for the proposition that even in the face of suspicious circumstances, cumula96
tive instances of negligent conduct violative of basic auditing standards,
will not necessarily amount to a finding of recklessness under the adopted
97
Seventh Circuit test.
The Third Circuit also failed to address the question, first raised by the
Coleco court, of whether its newly enunciated standard of culpability may
increase with the plaintiff's sophistication. 98 It is suggested that underlying
the McLean court's critical interpretation of the plaintiffs theory of recovery
was an antagonism to addressing questions of reliance and materiality when
faced with a single, sophisticated investor-plaintiff. 99
The Third Circuit's adoption of an accepted definition of recklessness for
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 purposes, and its inclusion within that standard
of the elements of common law fraud, evidences an intention to inject a
settling element into a notoriously unsettled area of securities law. It is
submitted, however, that continued case interpretation is necessary before it
can be said that the "semantic fog" pervading the scienter issue has been

91. See 420 F. Supp. at 1079, 1085.
92. See 540 F.2d at 34-37; notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
93. See 420 F. Supp. at 1085; note 13 supra.
94. See Metzger & Heintz, supra note 34, at 115 (auditor may still be found reckless if he
has notice of facts which materially affect the financial position of the client but which are not
specifically covered by official GAAP announcements).
95. See 599 F.2d at 1199-202; notes 8-11 & 75-79 and accompanying text supra; note 13
supra.
96. See 599 F.2d at 1200-02. The Third Circuit's failure to find actionable misconduct may
stem in part from its unwillingness to independently inquire, as the district court did, into the
standard of care in the accounting profession in the absence of testimony offered by plaintiff. Id.
at 1200 n.19.
97. See 599 F.2d at 1202; note 40 supra; notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
98. See note 50 supra.
99. See notes 1, 50 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
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successfully lifted. 100 On a more positive note, McLean presents the Third
Circuit's first full-fledged attempt to formulate the bounds of the state of
mind requirements to be applied in the ever-increasing volume of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims against accountants. Its definitions, borrowed
from other circuits as well as from the common law developments in state
courts, will thus have the benefit of refinement through application to
myriad fact situations in both spheres. 10 1
Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr.

100. See notes 21-29 & 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 41 & 65 supra.
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